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Notes
BALTIMORE CITY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES V.
BOUKNIGHT: THE REQUIRED RECORDS
DOCrRINE-LOGIC AND BEYOND
INTRODUCTION
In Baltimore City Department of Social Serices v. Bouknight,' the
Supreme Court held that a mother who is the custodian of her child
pursuant to court order may not invoke the fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination to resist a court order to produce her
child.2 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor reversed the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, which had vacated a civil contempt
order against the mother, Jacqueline Bouknight, for her failure to
produce her child. The Court denied Bouknight fifth amendment
protection because she "assumed custodial duties related to produc-
tion and because production is required as part of a noncriminal
regulatory regime." 4
This Note examines Bouknight's effect on the fifth amendment
self-incrimination privilege. Bouknight extends the "required
records" doctrine to encompass compelled testimony outside of the
realm of business documents.5 Although Bouknight correctly disal-
lowed using the privilege to resist the lower court's production or-
der, the Court's reasoning and consequent extension of the
required records doctrine was unwarranted. This Note examines
the requirements of the privilege against self-incrimination, the de-
velopment of the required records doctrine, and the Bouknight
Court's reasoning in extending that doctrine. Finally, this Note of-
fers an alternative to the Court's reasoning that would reach the
same result in a less contrived manner.
I. FACTS OF THE CASE
Jacqueline Bouknight's son Maurice was three months old when
1. 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990).
2. See id. at 903.
3. See in re Maurice M., 314 Md. 391, 550 A.2d 1135 (1988), rev'd sub noa. Baltimore
City Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990).
4. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 905.
5. Before Bouknight, the Court had limited use of the required records doctrine to
business documents. See infra Part III.
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he was hospitalized with a fractured leg.6 Subsequent examination
revealed other partially healed fractures.7 Because of these injuries,
and evidence that Bouknight mistreated the child even when he was
in the hospital,' hospital personnel notified the Baltimore City De-
partment of Social Services (DSS) that they suspected child abuse.9
In February 1987, DSS persuaded a court to remove Maurice from
Bouknight's control and to place him in foster care.1 ° But the court
subsequently modified the order, and returned custody temporarily
to Bouknight."
At an August 1987 hearing, the juvenile court determined that
Maurice was a "child in need of assistance" (CINA).' This gave the
juvenile court jurisdiction over Maurice, and the court placed him
under DSS's continuing supervision.'5 The parties agreed that
Maurice could remain in Bouknight's custody, subject to the ex-
tensive conditions of a protective supervision order requiring
Bouknight to cooperate with DSS, to continue in therapy, and to
refrain from physically punishing Maurice. 4
By April 1988, DSS returned to juvenile court, alleging that
Bouknight had refused to cooperate with DSS caseworkers and had
violated nearly every other aspect of the protective order.' 5 When
Bouknight failed to produce Maurice or to reveal where he could be
located, DSS petitioned the court to remove Maurice from her con-
6. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 903.
7. Id.
8. Id. Hospital personnel observed Bouknight shaking Maurice and dropping him
into his crib even though he was in a cast. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. In re Maurice M., 314 Md. 391, 394, 550 A.2d 1135, 1136 (1988), rev'd sub nom
Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990). The juvenile
court made its finding pursuant to MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801(e) (Supp.
1989), which reads:
"Child in need of assistance" is a child who requires the assistance of the court
because
(1) He is mentally handicapped or is not receiving ordinary and proper
care and attention, and
(2) His parents, guardian, or custodian are unable or unwilling to give
proper care and attention to the child and his problems provided, however, a
child shall not be deemed to be in need of assistance for the sole reason he is
being furnished nonmedical remedial care and treatment recognized by State
law.
Id.
13. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 903.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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trol and to place him in foster care. 16 On April 20, 1988, the juve-
nile court granted the petition, and cited Bouknight for violating the
protective custody order and for failing to appear at the hearing. 7
The court later issued orders requiring Bouknight to show cause
why she should not be held in civil contempt for refusing to produce
Maurice.' 8
When Bouknight did not produce Maurice at subsequent hear-
ings, the court found her in contempt and imprisoned her for failing
to produce Maurice or to reveal his whereabouts. t9 Bouknight
claimed the contempt order violated her fifth amendment guarantee
against self-incrimination in that she was compelled to "verbally or
physically produce incriminating statements or evidence."-20 Theju-
venile court rejected this claim, stating that the contempt order was
issued not because she refused to testify, but because she failed to
abide by the order for the production of Maurice. 2'
The Court of Appeals of Maryland vacated the juvenile court's
judgment upholding the contempt order.22 The Court of Appeals
found that the juvenile court's contempt order compelled
Bouknight to admit through the act of production a "measure of
continuing control and dominion over Maurice's person" 23 in a situ-
ation in which "Bouknight had a reasonable apprehension that she
will be prosecuted. '24
The DSS applied for a stay of judgment, which Chief Justice
Rehnquist granted in his capacity as Circuit Justice.25 The Court
subsequently granted DSS's petition for a writ of certiorari.26
16. Id. at 903-04. BCDSS officials visited Bouknight on two other occasions: she
first refused to reveal Maurice's whereabouts, and subsequently claimed that he was with
an aunt whom she would not identify. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 904.
19. See In re Maurice M., 314 Md. 391, 395-96, 550 A.2d 1135, 1137 (1988), rev'd sub
non Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990).
20. Id. at 396, 550 A.2d at 1137.
21. See Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 904.
22. See Maurice, 314 Md. 391, 550 A.2d 1135.
23. Id. at 404, 550 A.2d at 1141.
24. Id. at 403-04, 550 A.2d at 1141. The Court of Appeals also determined that the
balancing analysis used in California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971), was inapposite. See
Maurice, 314 Md. at 408, 550 A.2d at 1143. For a discussion of Byers, see infra notes 73-
80 and accompanying text.
25. See Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 488 U.S. 1301 (1988).
26. See Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 109 S. Ct. 1636 (1989).
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II. THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
The privilege against self-incrimination is rooted in early Eng-
lish law,27 and developed from the maxim, nemo tenetur seipsum
prodere: no man is held to incriminate himself.28 The fifth amend-
ment prohibition against self-incrimination, applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment, 29 provides as follows: "No per-
son . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." 0 Since its adoption in 1791, the Supreme Court
has come to interpret the clause as protecting an individual
from being compelled to make an incriminating testimonial
communication.3 '
The development of the privilege was controversial, and at-
tracted the attention of leading legal scholars.3 2 But however
heated the debate once was, the privilege is now an established and
integral part of American criminal jurisprudence.3 3 The Supreme
Court has acclaimed the privilege and its importance to democracy:
[W]e may view the historical development of the privilege
as one which groped for the proper scope of governmental
power over the citizen. As a "noble principle often tran-
27. See generally E. CLEARY, McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 114 (3d ed. 1984) (discussing
the privilege and its roots in the English ecdesiastical courts); Bonventre, An Alternative
to the Constitutional Privilege Against Se!/Jncrimination, 49 BROOKLYN L. REv. 31, 35-38
(1982) (tracing the privilege to a fourteenth century statute in which Parliament forbade
the clergy from interrogating laymen under oath in all matters except those involving
marriages and wills).
28. The phrase has been attributed to many authors, from Sir Edward Coke to St.
Chrysostomous to an unknown canonist. See Bonventre, supra note 27, at 36-37. See also
Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Sef-Incrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L. REv. 1,
3 n.3 (1930) (discussing possible roots in canon law); Riesenfeld, Law-Making and Legisla-
tive Precedent in American Legal History, 33 MINN. L. REV. 103, 118 (1949) (suggesting St.
Chrysostomous).
29. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (the fifth amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination extends to state action under the fourteenth amendment).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
31. See In re Maurice M., 314 Md. 391, 398, 550 A.2d 1135, 1138 (1988) (citing
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944)), rev'd sub nom. Baltimore City Dep't of
Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990).
32. These included Jeremy Bentham, John Wigmore, Roscoe Pound, Justice Benja-
min Cardozo, and Judge Henry Friendly. See Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The
Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671, 672-74 (1968); Saltzburg, The Re-
quired Records Doctrine: Its Lessons for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 53 U. CHI. L.
REv. 6, 7-8 (1986). See also E. CLrasY, supra note 27, § 114 (discussing Wigmore and
Bentham); Bonventre, supra note 27, at 31 & n. 1 (listing scholarly works on both sides of
the debate).
33. See, e.g., Malloy, 378 U.S. at 7 ("Mhe American system of criminal prosecution is
accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and the Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential
mainstay.").
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scends its origins," the privilege has become rightfully to
be recognized in part as an individual's substantive right, a
"right to a private enclave where he may lead a private life.
That right is the hallmark of our democracy. '" 4
But the privilege is not absolute. Three requirements must be
met in order for the privilege to attach: the activity against which
the privilege may be invoked must have a "real and appreciable"
danger of incrimination, the communication must be testimonial,
and it must be compelled. 5
The risk of incrimination must be "'real and appreciable,' and
not merely 'imaginary and unsubstantial.' "36 In Brown v. Walker, 7
the Supreme Court looked to English case law for the proposition
that
the danger to be apprehended must be real and apprecia-
ble, with reference to the ordinary operation of law in the
ordinary course of things; not a danger of an imaginary and
unsubstantial character, having reference to some ex-
traordinary and barely possible contingency, so improba-
ble that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his
conduct.3 8
34. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (quoting United States v. Grune-
wald, 233 F.2d 556, 579, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S.
391 (1957)). See Saltzburg, supra note 32, at 6.
Elsewhere the Supreme Court has explained that the privilege is founded on
our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of
self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather
than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating
statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair
play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government
to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and
by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the
entire load,".. . ; our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and
of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private
life,"... ; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that
the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection
to the innocent."
Doe v. United States (Doe 1I), 487 U.S. 201, 212-13 (1988) (quoting Murphy v. Water-
front Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
35. See generally E. CLEARY, supra note 27, §§ 123-25 (outlining the development of
the requirements).
36. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48 (1968). See generally E. CLEARY, supra
note 27, § 123 (development of the "real and appreciable" element).
37. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
38. Id. at 599-600 (citing Queen v. Boyles, 1 B. & S. 311, 330, 121 Eng. Rep. 730,
738 (K.B. 1861)).
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The communication must also be testimonial.3 9 The Supreme
Court qualified "testimony" for self-incrimination purposes by af-
firming in Schmerber v. California4 ° that what is protected is "evidence
of a testimonial or communicative nature."'4 1 Most recently, in Doe
v. United States (Doe 11)42 the Court stated that "in order to be testi-
monial, an accused's communication must itself, explicitly or implic-
itly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information. Only then is a
person compelled to be a 'witness' against himself."' 43 The act of
producing documents has been held to be communicative, enabling
the producer to invoke the fifth amendment privilege.
44
Finally, the testimonial activity must be compelled.45 The privi-
lege provides no protection to testimonial activities voluntarily un-
dertaken, even if the government later seeks the product of the
testimonial activity. The Court in Fisher v. United States46 held that
the privilege may not be asserted to resist compelled production of
documents that were voluntarily made.47 Fisher makes clear that
there is no blanket proscription against compulsory production of
items that may be incriminating to the person from whom they are
demanded.48
III. THE REQUIRED RECORDS DOCTRINE
In addition to the general qualifications discussed above, doc-
trines such as the required records doctrine limit the privilege. In
some circumstances, this doctrine denies fifth amendment protec-
39. See generally E. CLEARY, supra note 27, § 124 (development of the "testimonial"
element).
40. 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (an involuntary blood sample was not testimonial or com-
municative).
41. Id. at 761.
42. 487 U.S. 201 (1988) (consent directive authorizing banks to disclose records that
petitioner refused to sign was not testimonial).
43. Id. at 209-10.
44. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976) ("The act of producing
evidence in response to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own,
wholly aside from the contents of the papers produced."). See also United States v. Doe
(Doe 1), 465 U.S. 605, 612-14 (1984) ("Although the contents of a document may not be
privileged, the act of producing the document may be.").
45. See generally E. CLEAR, supra note 27, § 125 (development of the compulsion
element).
46. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
47. See id. at 410 n. 11. ("The fact that the documents may have been written by the
person asserting the privilege is insufficient to trigger the privilege... [a]nd unless the
Government has compelled the subpoenaed person to write the document.., the fact
that it was written by him is not controlling with respect to the Fifth Amendment issue."
(citations omitted)).
48. See E. CLEARY, supra note 27, § 126.
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tion to records kept in compliance with the law, even though the
records might be incriminating.49
The Supreme Court first established the required records doc-
trine5° in the landmark case Shapiro v. United States.51 In Shapiro, the
Court denied the defendant use of the privilege while sustaining his
conviction for violations of price regulations.52 The conviction was
based on the defendant's business records, which the government
required him to keep.53 The Court held that the privilege against
self-incrimination does not apply to "public documents, which the
defendant was required to keep, not for his private uses, but for
benefit of the public, and for public inspection. '
The Court's reasoning in Shapiro has been criticized.55 The
Court rested its decision in part on its view of an earlier case, Wilson
v. United States. 5 6 Most discussion of Wilson centers on the proposi-
tion that corporations and their officers may not invoke the privi-
lege.57 Because the state creates and regulates corporations, the
49. See, e.g., Saltzburg, supra note 32, at 10.
50. See id.
51. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
52. See id. at 19-20. Shapiro violated a provision of the Emergency Price Control Act.
Id at 3.
53. See id. at 5.
54. Id. at 17-18 (quoting State v. Donovan, 10 N.D. 203, 208-09, 86 N.W. 709, 711
(1901)). The Shapiro Court noted, however, that
there are limits which the Government cannot constitutionally exceed in requir-
ing the keeping of records which may be inspected by an administrative agency
and may be used in prosecuting statutory violations committed by the record-
keeper himself. But no serious misgiving that those bounds have been over-
stepped would appear to be evoked when there is a sufficient relation between
the activity sought to be regulated and the public concern so that the Govern-
ment can constitutionally regulate or forbid the basic activity concerned, and
can constitutionally require the keeping of particular records, subject to inspec-
tion by the Administrator.
Id. at 32. As the Court in Marchetti noted, Shapiro left those limits unexplored. Marchetti
v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 56 (1968).
55. See Mansfield, The Alertson Case: Conflict Between the Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion and the Government's Need for Information, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 103, 116 ("The limita-
tions on the privilege that have been developed seem for the most part arbitrary and
easily capable of being extended so as entirely to destroy the privilege. The Shapiro case
is an example."); McKay, Seyf-Incrimination and the New Privaty, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 193,
216 ("The central difficulty with Shapiro, frequently noted, is its overbreadth.") (citations
omitted); See also Mansfield, supra, at 148-49 (commenting that the decision was based
on half-convincing explanations); Saltzburg, supra note 32, at 13-15 (commenting that
Chief Justice Vinson cited almost no authority in discussing the privilege).
56. 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
57. See infra note 60; see also Shapiro, 335 U.S. at 56-67 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(detailed discussion of Wilson and the illustrative cases contained within); Saltzburg,
supra note 32, at 12-13 (the Shapiro Court's interpretation of Wilson is supported by al-
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privilege against self-incrimination cannot apply to custodians of
corporate records. 58 The Shapiro Court, however, gave Wilson a dif-
ferent interpretation: the privilege did not attach to corporate doc-
uments because the law requires corporations to keep them for the
public benefit.59 Justice Frankfurter dissented, stating that "the au-
thorities give no support to the broad proposition that because
records are required by law to be kept they are public records and,
hence, nonprivileged."'
After Shapiro, the Court intruded even further into the sphere of
the fifth amendment privilege. Enlarging upon the opening it made
with the required records doctrine, the Court upheld the Revenue
Act's registration provisions 61 requiring gamblers to register and to
pay occupational taxes, in United States v. Kahriger62 and Lewis v.
United States.63
In the mid-1960s the Court began limiting the scope of the re-
most no authority). But see Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarran Act, and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 687, 709-12 (1951) (disagreeing with Justice
Frankfurter's interpretation of Wdion and its illustrative cases).
58. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906). This principle was extended to
other associations of individuals (or collective entities) in United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694, 704 (1944) (principle applied to trade union).
59. See 335 U.S. at 16-18. See Saltzburg, supra note 32, at 13.
60. 335 U.S. at 64 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter also commented
on Wilson:
The Wilson case was correctly decided. The Court's holding boiled down
to the proposition that "what's not yours is not yours." It gives no sanction for
the bold proposition that Congress can legislate private papers in the hands of
their owner, and not in the hands of a custodian, out of the protection afforded
by the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 58. Justice Rutledge dissented in Shapiro as well, interpreting Wilson differently
than the majority:
The Wilson case dealt only with corporate records, and the claim of a cor-
porate officer having their custody to constitutional immunity against being re-
quired to produce them. None were required by law to be kept, in the sense
that any federal law required that they be kept and produced for regulatory
purposes.
Id. at 72 & n.2 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
61. Professor Saltzburg suggested that Shapiro influenced Congress and provided the
impetus for two new acts that "interpreted the Court's new doctrine broadly" and con-
tracted the boundaries of the privilege: the Internal Security Act of 1950 (McCarran
Act) and the Revenue Act of 1951. Saltzburg, supra note 32, at 15.
The McCarran Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-858 (1982), imposed record-keeping and re-
gistration requirements on Communist organizations. See Saltzburg, supra note 32, at
17. The Revenue Act, ch. 521, 65 Star. 452 (1951), imposed registration requirements
and an occupational tax upon persons in the business of accepting wagers. See
Saltzburg, supra note 32, at 15.
62. 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
63. 348 U.S. 419 (1955).
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quired records doctrine. In Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control
Board,14 the Supreme Court found that requiring individuals to reg-
ister with the government as members of the Communist Party vio-
lated the privilege.65 Although Albertson did not mention Shapiro, it
signalled a narrowing of the scope of the doctrine.66 Further evi-
dence of this trend came when the Court reconsidered the federal
gambling tax registration requirements. Relying on the language of
Albertson, the Supreme Court overruled its earlier decisions in Kah-
riger and Lewis in three companion decisions: Marchetti v. United
States,67 Grosso v. United States,68 and Haynes v. United States.69 In these
cases the Court refused to apply the Shapiro doctrine70 because the
registration requirements were not imposed in "an essentially non-
criminal and regulatory area of inquiry" 7 ' but rather upon a "selec-
tive group inherently suspect of criminal activities. "72
In California v. Byers,73 the Court considered the constitutional-
ity of California's "hit-and-run" statute, which required drivers in-
volved in accidents resulting in property damage to stop and give
their names and addresses.74 A plurality of the Court focused on
the civil regulatory nature of a self-reporting requirement, this time
64. 382 U.S. 70 (1965). The Court distinguished Albertson from United States v. Sul-
livan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927) (no privilege to resist a requirement to file an income tax
return), noting that the income tax return filing requirements upheld in Sullivan "were
neutral on their face and directed at the public at large," whereas in Albertson the re-
quirements were "directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal ac-
tivities." Albertson, 382 U.S. at 78-79.
65. See 382 U.S. at 71-74.
66. See Mansfield, supra note 55, at 116 ("Albertson stands at the threshold of an effort
by the Court to re-examine this whole group of cases ...."); see also Friendly, supra note
32, at 717-18 (referring to "Albertson Unlimited" as exemplifying an onrush of privilege
cases overtaking earlier decisions).
67. 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (registration of gamblers).
68. 390 U.S. 62 (1968) (registration of gamblers).
69. 390 U.S. 85 (1968) (registration of certain firearms).
70. See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 56-57; Grosso, 390 U.S. at 68-69; Haynes, 390 U.S. at 98-
99.
71. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 57 ("It is enough that there are significant points of differ-
ence between the situations here and in Shapiro which in this instance preclude, under
any formulation, an appropriate application of the 'required records' doctrine.") The
Court in Marchetti found Shapiro inapplicable because of the absence of "three principal
elements." See id. at 57. First, Marchetti was required to keep records other than the
records he customarily kept. Second, there were no "public aspects" to the information
demanded from Marchetti making it analogous to public documents. Finally, the re-
quirements were directed at a selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.
Id.
72. Id.
73. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
74. See id. at 426.
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using elements developed in Marchetti and Albertson 75 in a balancing
framework to find the requirement constitutionally valid.76 The
Court distinguished Byers from Marchetti, reasoning that the statute
was "not intended to facilitate criminal convictions but to promote
the satisfaction of civil liabilities" 77 and was directed at the public at
large. 78
A broad look at these later cases reveals a new doctrine taking
shape. 79 The Court clarified this new doctrine in Byers: the fifth
amendment privilege can be limited in the face of a generally appli-
cable, civil regulatory requirement.8 0 Byers, Marchetti, Albertson, and
United States v. Sullivan" l all considered the privilege in the context
of civil regulations that required some kind of reporting or other act
that communicates information to the government. These cases il-
luminate the limits of the new doctrine: Byers and Sullivan upheld
acceptable reporting requirements; Marchetti and Albertson demon-
strate requirements that violate the limits.
IV. THE REASONING OF Bouknight: Logic and Beyond
In Bouknight, the Supreme Court confronted an assertion of the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to a
contempt order compelling a mother either to produce her child or
reveal his exact whereabouts. The order implicated the self-incrimi-
nation clause because the act of producing the child would by itself
75. See supra note 71.
76. See 402 U.S. at 429-3 1; infra notes 80, 120 and accompanying text.
77. Id at 430.
78. See id.
79. Justice Marshall recognized this doctrine as a distinct line of fifth amendment
precedent having two common features: cases that "concern civil regulatory systems
not primarily intended to facilitate criminal investigations" and that "target the general
public." Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 912 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
80. See 402 U.S. at 430-31. This view accords with Justice Harlan's concurrence in
Byers. Disagreeing with the majority's view that there was no substantial danger of in-
crimination in requiring a driver involved in an accident to stop and give his name and
address, Justice Harlan preferred to
deal in degrees .... The question whether some sort of immunity is required
as a condition of self-reporting inescapably requires an evaluation of the assert-
edly noncriminal governmental purpose in securing the information, the neces-
sity for self-reporting as a means of securing the information, and the nature of
the disclosures required.
Id. at 454 (Harlan, J., concurring).
One legal scholar asserted that Harlan's analysis seems "more satisfactory and con-
sistent with Fifth Amendment policies." See E. CLEARY, supra note 27, § 142, at 353 n.24.
81. 274 U.S. 259 (1927) (the fifth amendment privilege denied to a person resisting
a requirement to file an income tax return).
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testify to Bouknight's control over and possession of Maurice, 2
which possibly could be used against her in a later criminal case."
In delivering the Court's opinion, Justice O'Connor assumed that
the act of producing the child was sufficiently incriminating and tes-
timonial for purposes of the privilege." Nevertheless, noting that
the privilege is not always available,8 5 Justice O'Connor denied
Bouknight fifth amendment protection on two grounds. First,
Bouknight assumed custodial duties that formed a basis for the or-
der to produce Maurice, and second, production was required as
part of a noncriminal regulatory regime. 6
The majority justified its decision by noting that there were
"several occasions" in which the Court had refused the privilege's
invocation in the face of a "regulatory regime constructed to effect
the State's public purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its crim-
inal laws." 87 Framing the Court's analysis and decision in the lan-
guage of Shapiro and Marchetti, Justice O'Connor explained the
Court's denial by invoking the required records doctrine's limits on
using the privilege. 8 She also cited Byers to support the general
proposition that the "ability to invoke the privilege may be greatly
diminished when invocation would interfere with the effective oper-
ation of a generally applicable, civil regulatory requirement.' '89
The majority's insistence on using the required records doc-
trine in Bouknight weakened the force of its reasoning. Justice Mar-
shall, in dissent, effectively attacked the majority's analysis of the
Bouknight facts using the logic of the required records doctrine. Jus-
tice O'Connor claimed that the Shapiro Court interpreted the princi-
82. 110 S. Ct. at 905 ("The Fifth Amendment's protection may nonetheless be impli-
cated because the act of complying with the government's demand testifies to the exist-
ence, possession, or authenticity of the things produced.") (citing Doe I, 487 U.S. 201,
209 (1988); Doe I, 465 U.S. 605, 612-14 & n.13 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391, 410-13 (1976)).
Although protection may be invoked for the act of complying with the demand,
protection may not be had regarding the contents or nature of the thing demanded.
Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 905 (citing Doe 1, 465 U.S. at 612 & n. 10; id. at 618 (O'ConnorJ.,
concurring); Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408-10).
83. Justice O'Connor conceded that Bouknight's "implicit communication of control
over Maurice at the moment of production might aid the State in prosecuting
Bouknight." See Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 905.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 905-06.
89. Id. at 906.
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pie in Wilson "as extending well beyond the corporate context." 9°
But Justice Marshall called this interpretation "baffling."'" The
Court in Shapiro discussed cases involving noncorporate business
records.92 It defies logic to suggest that the extension made in Sha-
piro from corporate business records to noncorporate business
records warrants extending the doctrine to include the compelled
production of a child who is under a juvenile court's protective su-
pervision order.
Justice O'Connor nevertheless bestowed upon Bouknight the
mantle of custodian.9" Justice Marshall correctly faulted the major-
ity's eagerness to characterize Maurice's mother as a "custodian" in
order to draw an easier connection between the Bouknight facts and
the required records doctrine, which also uses the word.9' The cus-
tody of a child is different from the custody of the records of a col-
lective entity.95 Justice Marshall, however, split hairs in his attempt
to divest Bouknight of any characteristics of a custodian. Although
he correctly noted that Maryland law defines a custodian as some-
one other than a parent or legal guardian, 96 he missed the point
that, in common usage, a parent may be said to have "custody" of
the child.97 More significant, for the purposes of a contempt order,
Maryland law treats parents, legal guardians, and custodians the
same.
98
90. Id. at 907. The principle extracted from Wilson, in which the Court surveyed
cases involving custody of public documents and records, is as follows:
[W]here, by virtue of their character and the rules of law applicable to them,
the books and papers are held subject to examination by the demanding au-
thority, the custodian has no privilege to refuse production although their con-
tents tend to criminate him. In assuming their custody he has accepted the
incident obligation to permit inspection.
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911).
91. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 910 & n.l (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. See 335 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1948).
93. See Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 907.
94. See id. at 910-11 (Marshall,J., dissenting). But cf infra note 118 for the proposi-
tion that custodianship is not properly an element of the required records doctrine.
95. The custodial agreement Boukaight entered into "does not. . . confer custodial
rights and obligations on Bouknight in the same way corporate law creates the custodial
status of a corporate agent." Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 911 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. See id. at 910 (Marshall, J., dissenting); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-
801(j) (Supp. 1989) (defining custodian as "a person or agency to whom legal custody
of a child has been given by order of the court, other than the child's parent or legal
guardian.").
97. See THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 494 (2d ed.
1987) (defining custody as "keeping, guardianship, care").
98. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-814(c) (Supp. 1989):
If a parent, guardian or custodian fails to bring the child before the court when
requested, the court may issue a writ of attachment directing that the child be
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Although it denied the privilege on required records grounds,
the Court strengthened its analysis by applying to Bouknight the limi-
tations found in Marchetti and Albertson. In contrast to the govern-
mental regulations that violated the privilege in those cases, the
Court pointed out that Maryland imposes its production
requirement as part of an "essentially noncriminal and regulatory
area of inquiry." 99 Furthermore, persons who care for children pur-
suant to a custodial order do not constitute a "selective group inher-
ently suspect of criminal activities."' °° Almost in passing, Justice
O'Connor used Byers to justify denying the privilege, repeating that
the regulation did not focus "exclusively on conduct which is crimi-
nal"' 0 ' and cannot be characterized as an effort to gain testimony
through the act of production.' 0 2 The majority's analysis of the
Maryland regulatory scheme is sound in spite of its application of
the required records doctrine.
Justice Marshall's objection to the majority's characterization of
Maryland's juvenile regulatory system is not as effective as his criti-
cism of its attempt to stretch the required records doctrine. Justice
Marshall disagreed with the Court's fifth amendment inquiry and its
characterization of the Maryland regulatory scheme.' 03 He objected
to looking narrowly at the noncriminal purpose of the regulations,
and instead advocated focusing on the regulations' practical ef-
taken into custody and brought before the court. The court may proceed
against the parent, guardian, or custodian for contempt.
Id.
99. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 907. The Court based its distinction on a Maryland Code
provision declaring the purpose of the general area of laws at issue to be essentially
noncriminal:
The purposes of the [Juvenile Causes] subtitle are: (1) To provide for the care,
protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children com-
ing within the provisions of this subtitle; and to provide for a program of treat-
ment, training and rehabilitation consistent with the child's best interests and
the protection of the public interest ....
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-802(a) (Supp. 1989).
100. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 907 (quoting Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965)). The Court focused on Maryland's statutory definition of
CINA, which does not imply criminal conduct by parents, but only that they be "simply
'unable or unwilling to give proper care and attention to the child and his problems.'"
Id. at 908 (citing MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801(e) (Supp. 1989) (emphasis
supplied)).
As Justice O'Connor correctly noted, although child abuse is often suspected in
CINA hearings, under some circumstances a child is deemed to be a CINA absent any
criminal suspicions. See id. at 907-08.
101. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 908 (citing California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 454 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
102. See id.
103. See id. at 910 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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fects.' ° 4 He complained that under the majority's analysis, "virtu-
ally any civil regulatory scheme could be characterized as
noncriminal."' °5 But the converse appears more likely under Jus-
tice Marshall's analysis: virtually any civil regulatory scheme could
be characterized as criminal. Justice Marshall would grant the use of
the fifth amendment privilege because, as he saw it, Maryland's civil
regime "inevitably intersects with criminal sanctions."'1°
Moreover, Justice Marshall asserted that the majority erred
when it concluded that the civil requirement was directed at the gen-
eral public. 0 7 Because the juvenile court has jurisdiction only over
designated children, rather than over all children in the state, Justice
Marshall argued that the civil regime is not broad enough to escape
violation. 108 He found that the scheme narrowly targets parents
who deny their children minimal care through abuse or neglect;' 9
hence, in Marchetti terms, the scheme targets a "selective group in-
herently suspect of criminal activities."' "10 Though Justice Marshall
equated Maryland's juvenile system with the revenue system in
Marchetti," it actually is much closer to the regulation of drivers
involved in traffic accidents discussed in Byers." 2 Marchetti ad-
dressed a federal wagering tax at a time when federal and state law
widely prohibited gambling. 1  Because gambling was nearly always
illegal, gamblers were inherently suspect of criminal activity. In
contrast, the self-reporting requirement under scrutiny in Byers,
though it defined some criminal offenses in the statutory text, was
"essentially regulatory, not criminal."" '  Drivers who have traffic
accidents are not a group highly suspect of criminal activities." 5
104. See id. at 912-13. Justice Marshall regarded the majority's characterization of the
system as "dubious ... highlight[ing] the flaws inherent in the Court's" analysis. Id. at
912.
105: Id.
106. Id. at 913 (emphasis in original). Justice Marshall also declared that the "State's
goal of protecting children from abusive environments through the juvenile welfare sys-
tem cannot be separated from criminal provisions that serve the same goal." Id. at 912-
13.
107. See id. at 913.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id. It is not clear how Justice Marshall justified interpreting § 3-801(e) to
require "abuse." The statute only mandates that the child's parents, guardian, or custo-
dian be "unable or unwilling to give proper care and attention to the child and his
problems." See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801 (e)(2) (Supp. 1989).
111. See id. at 912.
112. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
113. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 44 & n.5 (1968).
114. Byers, 402 U.S. at 430.
115. See id. at 456 (Harlan,J., concurring) ("In contrast, the 'hit and run' statute in the
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Likewise, Maryland parents whose children are found in need of
assistance are not necessarily suspected of criminal abuse or
neglect. 1 6
The Supreme Court denied Bouknight fifth amendment protec-
tion on the problematic basis of the required records doctrine. Jus-
tice O'Connor unnecessarily left the Court's reasoning open to
attack by squeezing Bouknight into the required records pattern. Jus-
tice Marshall, justified in exposing the unlikely reasoning and weak-
nesses of the majority's rationale, unfortunately lost sight of
Maurice's interests."17 Justice Marshall clearly was unhappy with
any limitation on the fifth amendment privilege, with the notable
exception of limitations on collective entities.11 8
V. A BETFER ALTERNATIVE
In Bouknight the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to estab-
lish a clear and simple doctrine governing limitations on the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. The seeds of a better decision,
however, lie within its text. Rather than forcing the required
records analogy, the Court could have arrived at a more credible
result by adopting and broadening the Byers rationale. A majority in
present case predicates the duty to report on the occurrence of an event which cannot,
without simply distorting the normal connotations of language, be characterized as 'in-
herently suspect'; ie., involvement in an automobile accident with property damage.")
116. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. See also In re Maurice M., 314 Md.
391, 419, 550 A.2d 1135, 1148 (1988) (McAuliffe, J., dissenting) ("the thrust of the
juvenile laws of this State is not criminal, but protective."), rev'd sub non., Baltimore City
Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990). Compare this view with the
characterization of California's hit-and-run statute, supra note 114 and accompanying
text.
117. Arguably, the primary interest at stake in Bouknight is the protection of children.
See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
118. Justice Marshall recognized "the well-established principle that a collective en-
tity, unlike a natural person, has no Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion." Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 911 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (referring to Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 384-85 (1911); United
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944)).
Justice Marshall criticized the Court's use of Shapiro to justify denying the privilege
to Bouknight. Because Shapiro "did not rest on the existence of an agency relationship
between a collective entity and the custodian of its records," he asserted that Shapiro "is
properly analyzed with the cases concerning testimony required as part of a noncriminal
regulatory regime, rather than with the cases concerning testimony compelled from cus-
todians of collective entities' records." Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 910 n.1.
Justice Marshall's point is well-taken in that Shapiro did not involve assertion of the
privilege by a custodian of a collective entity's records. His implication, however, that
the collective entity line of cases is clearly distinct from the required records doctrine
overlooks the fundamental entanglement of the two, given Shapiro's reliance upon Wil-
son. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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Byers supported a balancing test between the public need to limit the
privilege and the individual's constitutional right." 9 Lower federal
courts have used a Byers-Albertson analysis in scrutinizing other regu-
latory requirements, 20 and at least one leading commentator also
favors this approach.' 2' The Court should have used the Byers deci-
sion to deny Bouknight the privilege because it rests on broader
principles and provides a flexible balancing text.
Applying a balancing test to the case yields the same result as
the Bouknight judgment. As the dissent in In re Maurice M. found,
there is in this case the "strongest possible public policy in favor of
protecting children, clearly outweigh[ing] the limited cost of deny-
ing the application of the privilege."' 122 Considering the State's in-
terest in protecting children, 123 as well as its statutory mandate to
119. See Byers, 402 U.S. at 427. The plurality opinion of Chief Justice Burger reads:
Whenever the Court is confronted with the question of a compelled disdosure
that has an incriminating potential, the judicial scrutiny is invariably a dose
one. Tension between the State's demand for disclosures and the protection of
the right against self-incrimination is likely to give rise to serious questions.
Inevitably these must be resolved in terms of balancing the public need on the
one hand, and the individual claim to constitutional protections on the other;,
neither interest can be treated lightly.
Id.
With the concurring opinion ofJustice Harlan, five justices advocated using a bal-
ancing test in compelled disclosure cases. Only Justice Harlan, however, actually en-
gaged in a balancing test in Byers. See id. at 454-58 (Harlan, J., concurring). The
plurality found that the risk of self-incrimination involved in the California accident re-
porting requirement was not substantial, making a balancing test unnecessary. See id. at
430-31.
120. See United States v. Des Jardins, 747 F.2d 499, 507-09 (9th Cir. 1984), modified on
other grounds, 772 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding Bank Secrecy Act reporting re-
quirements); United States v. Dichne, 612 F.2d 632, 638-41 (2d Cir. 1979) (same) cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980); United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708, 727-28 (2d Cir.)
(federal securities laws upholding regulatory disclosure requirements), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 824 (1978); United States v. Parente, 449 F. Supp. 905, 910-14 (D. Conn. 1978)
(upholding federal statute provisions requiring liquor dealers to pay a special tax).
121. See E. CLYARY, supra note 27, § 142.
The best approach seems simply in recognizing the doctrine as a limitation on
the privilege based upon the public need for information in limited circum-
stances to make effective public regulation of certain activities. Thus in a spe-
cific case the question becomes whether there is sufficient public interest to
outweigh the strong policy in favor of maintaining the protection of the
privilege.
Id.
122. 314 Md. 391, 418, 550 A.2d 1135, 1148 (1988) (McAuliffe, J., dissenting), rev'd
sub nom Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990). Judge
McAuliffe followed the Byers approach, noting that "[t]he gist of the Albertson-Byers princi-
ple is that a common-sense approach to the application of even the most important
constitutional rights is appropriate." Id. at 419, 550 A.2d at 1149.
123. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
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do so, it is difficult to avoid concluding that Bouknight should not
have been allowed to invoke her fifth amendment privilege at the
expense of the life or well-being of her child.
It is noteworthy that prior to the decision, it appeared the Court
might apply a Byers analysis in Bouknight.124 Its failure to do so,
though, is neither inexplicable nor surprising. If the Court had es-
tablished a clear-balancing test for the privilege, it could have sug-
gested a dangerous crack in the fifth amendment's foundation.125 It
was safer for the Court to squeeze Bouknight into an established lim-
iting precedent than to announce a potentially sweeping limitation
on the scope of the fifth amendment privilege.
The scope of the Court's consideration of fifth amendment
principles in Bouknight was narrow. Though the Court held that
Bouknight could not invoke the privilege against self-incrimination
to resist the production order, it refused to decide whether she
could later invoke the privilege in a criminal prosecution.' 26 Justice
O'Connor noted, however, that limitations on the use of her com-
pelled testimony were not foreclosed. 27 If the opinion is viewed as
merely denying the privilege to resist a contempt order, limitations
on its use in a criminal proceeding present an altogether different
issue. Justice O'Connor hinted that the privilege might still be avail-
able to Bouknight should the state attempt to use the fruits of the
production order in a criminal prosecution.' 28 Accordingly, Justice
Marshall was somewhat assuaged by the Court's position, though he
would have preferred that the Court adopt a positive statement of
exclusion. ' 29
124. The dissent's reasoning in Maurice and Chief Justice Rehnquist's reasoning in
granting the stay ofjudgment, focused chiefly on a Byers analysis. See Maurice, 314 Md. at
416-19; Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 488 U.S. 1301, 1304-05
(1988). According to Chief Justice Rehnquist: "protecting infants from child abuse
seems to me to rank in order of social importance with the regulation and prevention of
traffic accidents." Id at 1305.
125. In the words ofJustice Black, "vesting such power in judges to water down con-
stitutional rights does indeed 'embark us' on . . . 'uncharted and treacherous seas.'"
California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 463 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
126. See Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 908.
127. See id. ("The same custodial role that limited the ability to resist the production
o rder may give rise to corresponding limitations upon the direct and indirect use of that
testimony.").
128. See id. Justice O'Connor cited cases demonstrating that "[iun a broad range of
contexts, the Fifth Amendment limits prosecutors' ability to use testimony that has been
compelled." Id. at 909.
129. See id. at 914 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
I take some comfort in the Court's recognition that the State may be prohibited
from using any testimony given by Bouknight in subsequent criminal proceed-
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CONCLUSION
In Bouknight the Supreme Court extended the required records
doctrine to encompass the compelled production of a child pursu-
ant to a custodial order. The decision illustrates the Court's reluc-
tance to tread heavily on the fifth amendment, but at the same time
it advances an important societal goal. The Court has a history of
breaking new ground in constitutional analysis where the interests
of children are concerned.
3 0
Nevertheless, Bouknight's jurisprudence is flawed. Extending
the required records doctrine beyond the realm of business docu-
ments calls into question not only the precedents the Court relied
upon, but also the Court's analysis of fifth amendment issues. The
observation of Justice Jackson, dissenting in Shapiro, is appropriate:
Today's decision introduces a principle of considerable
moment. Of course, it strips of protection only business
men and their records; but we cannot too often remind
ourselves of the tendency of such a principle, once ap-
proved, to expand itself in practice "to the limits of its
logic."' 3'
Justice Jackson's fears have been realized. The required records
doctrine, approved in Shapiro, has reached the limits of its logic, and
passed beyond, in Bouknight.
H. BRUCE DORSEY
ings... [though] I am not content to deny Bouknight the constitutional protec-
tion required by the Fifth Amendment now in the hope she will not be convicted
later on the basis of her own testimony.
Id. (emphasis in original).
130. In Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979),Justice Powell noted the Court's special
concerns for children:
The Court has long recognized that the status of minors under the law is
unique in many respects. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter aptly put it: "Children
have a very special place in life which the law should reflect. Legal theories and
their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically
transferred to determination of a State's duty towards children." May v. An-
derson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (concurring opinion). The unique role in our
society of the family... requires that constitutional principles be applied with
sensitivity and flexibility to the special needs of parents and children.
Belloti, 443 U.S. at 633-34.
More recently, the Court demonstrated its concern for children by rejecting a claim
that using one-way television for child witnesses in a child sexual abuse case violated the
sixth amendment confrontation clause. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
131. 335 U.S. 1, 70 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
